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Douglas C. Bennett and Kenneth E. Sharpe

Is There a Democracy "Overload"?
A principal feature of recent neoconservative thought has been the scapegoating of democracy for a host of political and economic
ills—from declining governmental competence
to budget deficits and inflation. Our political
system, the argument goes, has become "overloaded" by demands from the citizenry, and
democracy itself is to blame for stimulating
these excessive demands. Less democracy is
the proposed remedy.
Samuel Huntington provided the first influential formulation of this argument in the
Trilateral Commission's Report on the Governability of Democracies.' A "democratic surge"
in the 1960s had raised the level of popular
expectations and group demands on the government, he argued, and this had resulted in
both an expansion of governmental activity and
a decline in governmental authority. He saw a
widening gulf between expectation and institutional capacity, which led him to worry about
the viability of democracy. To avoid "overload," he urged moderation in the level of
demands. "The effective operation of a democratic political system requires some measure
of apathy and noninvolvement on the part of
some individuals or groups."
All that varies in later versions of this idea
are the alleged symptoms of political and economic ill health. While Huntington is concerned with the sapping of governmental authority, far more numerous and influential are

This article is part of a series, appearing intermittently
in our pages, on the general theme of problems of
democracy in advanced industrial countries. The series
has been made possible by a grant from the Joyce
Mertz-Robert Gilmore Foundation, to which we express our gratitude. — EDS.

statements that see economic illness as the
consequence of rising individual and group
demands. If rising demands overload the federal budget and create deficits, then publicsector borrowing and the resultant expansion of
the money supply cause, or at least aggravate,
the inflation we have been experiencing for the
last decade. 2
The strongest indictment of democracy for
our economic woes comes from Samuel
Brittan, who blames it for "the English sickness"—inflation, unemployment, lack of productivity, and balance-of-payment troubles.
Organized interest groups, especially "union
monopolies," insist upon larger shares of the
national product. Insofar as they are successful, they may bring about a measure of unemployment, since some goods are being offered
at a price above the market equilibrium. These
and other groups then clamor for government
relief from this unemployment. And here electoral competition works its mischief: "Politicians," writes Brittan, "compete in the marketplace for the votes of an extensive electorate in
the same way that oilmen bid for oil or salesmen bid for customers." Democracy thus encourages these rising group demands. 3
If all this is true, what are we to do? One
relatively mild prescription urges constitutional amendments to limit government spending. Huntington's cure is greater reliance on
nondemocratic sources of authority (expertise,
seniority, experience, special talents) to place
necessary limits on democracy; he also counsels "self-restraint." Samuel Brittan implores
the intelligentsia to give up their infatuation
with egalitarianism. "The ideal of equality," he
argues, "has done immense damage to my
country." Perhaps the most ominous prescrip319

tion comes from Robert Lubar, an editor of
Fortune. Drawing together the work of these
overload theorists, he assigns democracy "a
large share of the blame for the economic
troubles that afflict the advanced nations." "If
democracy fails to cope with inflation, the
system itself may be in danger," Lubar concludes. "Democracy helped put us in our
present fix and it has to get us out. Otherwise a
desperate nation may well reach for ways that
imperil our liberty." 4
This style of thought is founded upon an
intellectual conception of democracy that prevailed over the last half-century: the economic
theory of democracy, which was most lucidly
formulated by Joseph Schumpeter in the
1930s. It conceives of democracy merely as a
political mechanism, modeled on the market,
"in which individuals acquire the power to
decide by means of a competitive struggle for
people's votes." 5 An important distinction is
drawn between elites and masses, though both
are assumed to be motivated by the same
calculus of benefit and loss. Elites are seen as
political entrepreneurs who seek to gain power
and its rewards by offering programs (products) more attractive than those of their competitors. At intervals, competing sets of elites
present themselves to the electorate—"the
masses." The masses are seen as consumers
who spend their votes in the political marketplace to purchase programs and their sponsoring decision-makers. The masses are taken to
be involved in politics only marginally and
intermittently, with their main objective that
government satisfy their demands.
All the overload theorists share four major
assumptions of the economic theory of democracy:
(1) Men and women are conceived as atomistic, self-interested, rational individuals who
seek to maximize pleasure through accumulating material goods.
(2) Political participation is essentially the
making of demands upon government.
(3) Democracy, because it is reduced to a mere
marketlike mechanism, cannot affect the character of the citizenry or the content of these
demands.
(4) Finally, the economic theory of democracy
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is taken to be a factual description of what
democracy "really is," not a moral or prescriptive theory of what it "should be."
THERE IS A CONCEPTUAL FUZZINESS to the overload theory that makes it difficult to criticize
it. Analyses rarely specify what kinds of demands cause overload through their excess.
Demands on government for more transfer
payments to the elderly and unemployed might
strain limited budgets; but other demands do
not. The anti-Vietnam War protests and current protests against increased militarization
can be seen as demands that government spend
less: here increased demand could produce less
overload. By selective examples, the overload
theory implies that all popular demands—and
democracy itself—lead to excess.
The overload theory also tends to take "supply" as a given. It assumes, for example, that
taxes cannot be raised, even though the U.S.
tax rate is relatively low compared to many of
our major capitalist competitors. Moreover,
rarely is the allocation of supply questioned.
The very conception of "overload" itself is
hazy. While its advocates claim that government is being "overloaded" by demands that it
spend (or do) more, what often appears (or
feels) to them as "overloaded" are private
corporations—as with demands for more government regulation of occupational safety or
the environment.
Despite these ambiguities, we cannot simply
dismiss the overload thesis. If we employ a
market metaphor to describe democracy, there
certainly is some meaning to "demand" and
"supply," so that there indeed can be an excess
of demand over supply—an "overload." Simply put, what the overload theorists have discovered is a corollary of the economic theory
of democracy: democracy conceived as a political market lacks the built-in equilibrating
mechanism of the economic market. In the
continuous pull and haul between sellers and
buyers, and even in very imperfect markets,
economic wants have a mechanism that pushes
toward balance between supply and demand.
But a political market has no equivalent mechanism.
When originally propounded, the economic
theory of democracy contained no such worry

about overload, for it was assumed that the
citizenry would be politically active only
sporadically. So long as the Western democracies functioned smoothly in the years after
World War II, overload was only a theoretical
possibility. But when political participation increased in the late 1960s and early 1970s and
Western democracies found themselves with
economic ills, Huntington et al. discovered
"overload." Forgetting that theirs is but one
model of democracy, they claimed the problem
to be inherent in democracy itself.

S

ELF-RESTRAINT: Solution for Overload?
Given the basic assumptions of the economic
theory of democracy, there is nothing surprising about the solutions propounded by its theorists. When "demand" is greater than "supply," and supply cannot easily be increased (as
in the current climate of stagnation), demand
must be limited. But how? Either the citizenry
must exercise self-restraint in its demands
upon government, or there must be some kind
of external restraint—in milder form, corporatism or depoliticization; in more coercive form,
authoritarianism. Anyone committed to democracy would prefer the first alternative. But
can the economic theory of democracy provide
a satisfactory basis for self-restraint, or must it
rely on undemocratic methods? One possibility
is that self-restraint could be founded in selfinterest; another, that it might be founded in
shared values.

SELF-INTEREST AS A SOURCE OF RESTRAINT? According to the economic theory of democracy,
people enter the political market as rational,
self-interested individuals who seek to maximize fulfillment of their largely material desires. The following argument maintains that
this self-interest could also encourage individuals to restrain their demands on government.
Social cooperation is in your interest. Without it there will be conflict and anarchy, and it
will be impossible for you to have any security
in the pursuit of your interests. A democracy is
the best political form for such cooperation
because it is more likely than any other political system to control the rulers and thereby
allow your interests to be represented and protected. This possibility, however, presents two

serious problems.
If self-restraint is rational because democracy is valued, but democracy is valued merely
because it generally serves one's self-interest,
then the value of democracy, and of self-restraint, can be displaced by something of more
immediate value to oneself. As soon as compelling arguments can be made that one's private
goals are best pursued by violating democratic
processes, it is irrational for the self-interested
individual either to support democracy or restrain his pursuit of private goals.
The other difficulty here is the free-rider
problem. It is possible that rational, self-interested individuals who continue to value democracy and know that excessive demands can
undermine democracy will still find it irrational to exercise self-restraint. In many situations
each person finds it rational to pursue private
interests even though everyone acting this way
would threaten a shared goal. Rational individuals will then see no reason to restrain their
own excessive demands since doing so as individuals is not sufficient (or even necessary) to
sustain democracy. The egoist in the political
marketplace does best when other people restrain their demands and he does not. Such an
individual will be a free rider, carried along on
the self-restraint of others.
CAN SHARED VALUES be a source of self-restraint? The rational, self-interested individuals
assumed to inhabit the marketplace thus provide fragile building blocks for the self-restraint needed to support democracy. But if
this is true, why has democracy seemed so
stable in the United States? Is it not possible,
perhaps, that the citizenry does not mainly
consist of the rational egoists assumed to be its
mainstay by adherents of the economic theory
of democracy? Perhaps, in the past, the actions
of most citizens were informed by shared values of trust, compassion, social responsibility,
public-mindedness, and national community,
which did restrain them in the pursuit of private or selfish goals.
Before the 19th century, political theorists
emphasized the importance of such civic virtue. They saw individuals who were ruthless in
behalf of private goals as a corrupting force
that invited despotism. Rousseau argued that
321

democracy would cease to function as soon as
individual self-interest rather than the common
good guided citizens. John Stuart Mill argued
that there was a certain natural sympathy in all
of us that, if nurtured by education, would
provide reliable "internal sanctions" restraining greed. More recently, Fred Hirsch has
emphasized the importance of such shared
values for the continued functioning of even
the economic market. "Truth, trust, acceptance, restraint, obligation—these are among
the social virtues grounded in religious beliefs
which are also now seen to play a central role in
the functioning of an individualistic, contractual economy." Hirsch stresses this, we must
note for the future course of our argument,
because he is concerned about the dangers
posed by the erosion of such a "supporting
social morality." 6
The significance of such shared values was
not lost even on Schumpeter when he formulated his market model of democracy. He argued that one condition for the success of a
democratic society was a "social stratum"
(such as the English aristocracy) with high
"moral character" from which politicians
would be chosen by the electorate. Another
condition was at least a minimum of democratic self-control—a high enough moral as
well as intellectual level among both electorate
and politicians. Most of those that have
adopted his conception of democracy, however,
put little emphasis on shared values. Only
recently, when the overload theorists concluded that the current "crisis" was the result
of a lack of restraint, has some attention been
given to civic virtue. Brittan, for example,
mentions the importance of "the moral heritage of the feudal system" as a source of
democratic self-restraint. The notion that personal success was firmly connected with "duty
performed" helped limit "the demands on the
sharing-out functions of the state." But "the
feudal legacy was bound to be extinguished by
the torchlight of secular and rationalistic inquiry, which was itself so closely associated
with the rise of capitalism."
Even such cursory attention to shared values
reveals a crucial, hidden assumption in the
economic theory of democracy: if equilibrium
is to be maintained between demand and sup322

ply, self-interest must be internally tempered
by a public morality. But such belated recognition of civic virtue also reveals an important
limitation in the whole theory. If it remains
within its own assumptions, the theory is unable to give an account of shared values. It
conceives of no basic part of human character
or psychology—such as John Stuart Mill's
"sympathy"—which could serve as a foundation for such civic virtue. The men and women
participating in the democratic market, like
the economic market itself, are simply selfinterested pursuers of private goals. And since
these individuals are taken to exist prior to any
social institutions, it is impossible for the theory to recognize a historical process by which
human nature is shaped. Such basic assumptions thus make it difficult for overload theorists to move beyond an ad hoc recognition of
shared values and toward an explanation of the
conditions under which these values are maintained or eroded.

L

et's now talk of a worse problem. Capitalism as much as democracy requires a broad
sharing of certain values—for example, trust
and honesty. In the past, not only religion and
other traditional bases of morality but the
functioning of democracy itself helped sustain
capitalism as well as democracy. Capitalism,
as Schumpeter suspected, cannot be relied on
to reproduce even the minimal shared values
that it nevertheless needs. It may even subtly
undermine them. If so, the attempt to deprive
democracy of an independent moral foundation and justify it instead by a market model
aggravates the problem. There are distinct
dangers in viewing both a society's economic
and political arrangements through the lens of
the market.
for the shared
values enabling self-restraint is the morality of
the political system itself. As the political system becomes more closely entwined with the
economic system, the outcome of the political
economy must be seen as moral and just, if the
value of self-restraint is to be maintained. So
long as shared values had a traditional basis in
custom or religion, there was a built-in, almost
(1) AN IMPORTANT FOUNDATION

unconscious check on the pursuit of self-inter- restraint. Alternately, the more general workest: lying, cheating, deceiving, and harming ings of the market itself may be encouraging
another to benefit yourself were just plain unrestrained self-interest and discouraging
wrong. But as religion and other supports for civic virtue.
The first contention is based on the link
morality eroded, a conscious, rational basis
became necessary. Mere self-interest (we saw citizens see between the "political market" and
earlier) was not enough, and this was especially the economic market: they no longer judge
true when contradictions emerged between democracy (as perhaps they once did) as a
capitalist accumulation and democratic social "working" or "just" system in narrow political
reform. The only remaining prop for internal terms but rather by wider political-economic
restraint of self-interest is a conscious sense of criteria. Because the overload theorists see
civic duty, the recognition that certain actions demands as a problem for democracy they miss
are just and moral because they support a just seeing the source of these demands in the
and moral society. People foreswear certain injustice of the larger political economy.
Since the New Deal, our government has
kinds of self-interested actions in the name of
justice. Yet such a sense of justice cannot gradually come to be seen as responsible for
simply be tacked on to self-interest. If people welfare measures that would ameliorate ecoare to be educated to a sense of civic duty, they nomic inequalities and lessen the risks to the
must perceive the system itself to be just and normal routines of life posed by the market.
Other citizens, often from economically more
moral.
The theorists of overload crisis have a diffi- powerful classes, have come to see the governcult time understanding that the foundation for ment as responsible for market outcomes in a
self-restraint is the larger morality of the po- different sense: democratic government is exlitical economy itself. They do not see the pected to manage the economy to insure
connection between the citizens' view of the steady, noninflationary growth so as to enable
market system and the citizens' willingness to capital accumulation and profit. This managed
restrain demands. Why? Because, given the economy goes hand-in-hand with the welfare
assumptions of the economic theory of democ- state: growth is considered essential to finance
racy, the individual (with his own wants and income-maintenance programs, and governinterests) is conceived of as apart from and ment management of the economy ensures
unaffected by the democratic system. Democ- such growth. Democracy is seen to "work"
racy simply is a mechanism for aggregating insofar as government can accomplish these
individual demands. The possibility that the twin tasks of reform and accumulation.
kind and level of demands made would be
Changing historical conditions may be forcshaped by a view of the morality of the market ing a clash between these tasks. The ebbing of
system itself cannot be accommodated within U.S. hegemony in the international economy,
the economic theory of democracy.
rising energy costs, declining industries, and
This in turn raises two other closely related persistent stagflation all are making it harder
problems: the market itself may actually pro- for the democratic welfare state to finance the
mote the disappearance of the shared values social reforms needed to lessen the inequalities
upon which it rests, and it may be unable to of the economic market. Particularly when
reconstruct the necessary shared values once accompanied by huge military expenditures,
these are threatened.
the continued financing of these reforms has
called forth fiscal and monetary policies that
(2) THE MARKET ITSELF may help to undermine interfere with growth and accumulation.
the shared values upon which it rests in two
In frustration, people clamor for the governrather distinct ways. The current problems ment to do something. The overload-crisis theowith our capitalist political economy and the rists, however, overlook the deeper roots of the
way these are dealt with by the government problems and fail to see that citizens may be
may be perceived as unfair or unjust, thus making these demands because they perceive
undermining the moral justification for self- the political economy—capitalism, and not
323

just democracy—as dishing out results that are
unfair and unjust.
There is also a more subtle way in which the
market may help undermine shared values: by
encouraging the pursuit of self-interest and
discouraging action based on virtue. Hirsch,
for example, argues that the precapitalist and
preindustrial social morality that served to contain economic individualism within permissible
limits "has diminished with time and with the
corrosive contact of the active capitalist values—and more generally with the greater anonymity and greater mobility of industrial society." Drawing on a variety of data, Robert
Lane has argued that the market has definite
consequences for the shaping of personality. It
has increased self-reliance and cognitive complexity, and it has taught "a version of justice
where work or contribution to the economy is
rewarded." But the market also erodes civic
virtue:
Through its emphasis on transactions it has
eroded some of the sources of sociocentrism. By
its destruction of sources of humane values, its
instrumentalism, it has made identity hard to
achieve and its amoral ism has made difficult the
identification with moral values.'

(social morality, civic virtue) cannot be reconstructed through a market
method. Schumpeter recognized that the national character and habits necessary for democratic self-control could not be produced by the
democratic method itself, but he did not elaborate on these difficulties. The shared values
that undergird self-restraint and allow a democracy to function are, like public goods,
things that benefit the whole society. Yet, like
other public goods, these social norms cannot
be provided through the market. Everyone
may know that self-restraint is something that
would benefit the entire society, but the democratic marketplace never offers people the
choice between a disorderly society ruled by
excessive demands and an orderly society ruled
by reasonable, self-restraining people. Instead,
it gives its citizens a choice among various
politicians who rarely speak for a party with a
coherent program, offering instead discrete,
piecemeal proposals. The market makes it rational for individuals to decide each of these
(3) SHARED VALUES
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matters on the basis of individual self-interest,
despite any unintended consequences.

A

central element in the critique of the
economic theory of democracy is that this
conception fails to provide for the inculcation
of democratic values through participation.
Theorists who make this criticism—such as C.
B. Macpherson—deny that human beings are
essentially and unchangeably self-interested
utility maximizers. They argue instead that the
social order and particularly its political and
economic institutions deeply affect human
personality. If participation were nothing more
than occasional trips to the polls, the citizenry
would never learn the public morality needed
for the survival of democracy. "A political act,
to be done only once in a few years, and for
which nothing in the daily habits of the citizen
has prepared him," John Stuart Mill argued,
"leaves his intellect and his moral dispositions
very much as it found them."
These critics are attacking not democracy
but the economic model of democracy. Drawing on such earlier theorists as Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, and G. D. H.
Cole, they argue for the educative importance
of participation in making political decisions,
not just the election of—or pressure on—decision-makers. Such participation should take
place at the local and national level, as well as
in the workplace. Public-spiritedness, respect
for others' virtues, a sense of responsibility, a
sense of justice, and the proper self-restraint
that follows—in short, a democratic character—all these are being developed by participation, though they may be something that
already exists.
The theorists of economic democracy erroneously reduce human beings to rational egoists, call that egoism human nature, and then
describe (or justify) a market method for aggregating these interests without ever realizing
that the method itself discourages anything but
the development of such utility maximizers.
The more people are shaped in the image of the
model, the less well, ironically, the model will
work; for the democratic character, discouraged by the market method, is no longer there
to support it. The theorists of participatory

democracy, on the other hand, argue for transforming democracy.
There is, however, one important assumption
these theories of more participatory democracy
share with the economic theory, and the pitfall
to which this leads warrants exploration. The
economic model of democracy, as we have
been arguing, is blind to the relationship between its market method and social morality.
The economic theory divides facts from values,
and it insists that values are merely a matter of
individual taste. This doctrine will not make it

Arthur L. Fox

Dissenters Win Right
to Space in Union Papers

I

n a precedent-making case, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that members
of the National Rural Letter Carriers Association
(NRLCA) have a right of access to their union's
newspaper. The case arose when the NRLCA leadership refused to run a paid advertisement in the
Rural Letter Carrier submitted by the Knox County
(Tenn.) Local. The ad appealed to the membership
to reject the 1981 contract negotiated by the
NRLCA leadership with the U.S. Postal Service.
The Knox County Local ... was comprised of
125 letter carriers, could not afford a mailing to the
64,000 members covered by the new contract and
looked for other means of communicating opposition to the agreement. Inasmuch as the Rural Letter
Carrier regularly carried commercial advertisements, the Knox County members hired an ad
agency to prepare and submit camera-ready copy
of their message, together with the cost of a fullpage ad. The journal's editor refused the ad because, in his words, it "would just create internal
strife." The local and several members sued the
NRLCA claiming that the Union was stifling communication in violation of their Title 1 right of free
speech. They argued that there could be no democratic referendum over the new contract if members voting on it were not exposed to competing
viewpoints. Relying upon decisions upholding the
First Amendment freedom of the press, the district
court refused to order the NRLCA to print the ad
and dismissed the action.
The court of appeals reversed. It rejected the
notion that a union may lawfully restrict expression
because of its message. On the contrary, the court

possible to say which values ought to be encouraged. Perhaps because they share the doctrine of the subjectivity of values, the theorists
of participatory democracy also tend to be
silent about the kind of public morality that
ought to be encouraged. In insisting on more
active participation as a necessary condition
for democracy, they argue for replacing one
method with an alternate, better method. And
thereby they risk expecting far too much of a
mere method.
More participation will not itself automati-

said, the democratic process cannot function if, on
a matter as important as contract ratification, there
is no debate. The court observed that free and
enlightened self-government can exist only where
there is "a rational interchange of ideas on issues
of great moment—the very goal envisioned by the
framers of the First Amendment.... By refusing to
allow [dissident members] access to its union-wide
publication, the NRLCA foreclosed the only reasonable avenue for the effective communication of
opposition to the new agreement."
Members of other unions will undoubtedly
want to know whether they, too, can now force their
union publications to print their messages on union
policy matters. That depends. Technically, the Sixth
Circuit opinion prohibits only discrimination based
upon the content of members' speech. Unions may
try to argue that the Letter Carriers' decision applies only where the union officers advocate one
side of an issue in a publication that routinely
accepts advertisements or member statements.
Even then, unions may contend that members can
force journals to print their viewpoint only where
the paper is the exclusive forum of communication
on a particular subject; if there is some other reasonable means of disseminating opposing viewpoints, the union may argue, it must be used instead of publication in the journal.
However, in the landmark Letter Carriers' decision, the court says much more. But exactly how far
it does go may be determined by the next court that
is asked to decide, under different circumstances,
whether the members of some other union can
force their publication to print their message on
union policy.
Meanwhile, the Letter Carriers' decision is an
encouraging breakthrough for union democracy.
For the first time, the right of union members to
express dissenting views in their own union newspaper has been recognized in federal court.

— Union Democracy Review, January 1984
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cally create democratic character. Democratic
theorists must therefore also argue for a public
morality, a conception of social and economic
justice that can deal with such issues as the
proper distribution of sacrifice and gain, especially in a time of recession or slowed growth.
The social virtues learned through participatory democracy must be grounded in the justness of the political economy. Unless the question of the justness of the political economy is
squarely faced, participatory democracy will
be as inadequate as market democracy.
THE OVERLOAD-CRISIS THEORISTS use impressionistic data and a bold example or two to
demonstrate the excessive nature of demands,
but their thesis has not stood up well to systematic empirical tests. Surveying the available
evidence for the 1970s, Hugh Heclo concludes
that
. almost nowhere could political parties be
found trying to outbid each other in promises to
continue rapid expansion in social policy
spending. . . . [Moreover,] survey information
for the United States and Western Europe shows
a considerable willingness in the general public
to act sensibly and lower expectations in response to (and in anticipation of) unfavorable

events.'
Nevertheless, the overload-crisis argument

has shown itself to have a distinct intuitive
appeal, perhaps because of the extent to which
market imagery has permeated our national
consciousness. We cannot dismiss it without
scrapping altogether the economic theory of
democracy from which it so easily derives.
Democracy must be conceived not just as a
method but as a kind of society with a set of
moral ends. Equality cannot simply be the
equal weight of each citizen's demands as
expressed through the vote. There must be a
promise of relatively equal life chances for all
citizens and a social definition of life that
encourages the development of character, not
merely the satisfaction of ever-increasing material desires. The distribution of sacrifices and
benefits must be perceived as fair, if selfrestraint is to be thought of as moral. Finally,
there must be institutional mechanisms for
debate and decision that not only accord citizens power over the terms of their lives but
teach civic virtue and educate citizens to their
responsibilities.
Unless the economic theory of democracy is
swept away, we risk being caught in its dangerous web. "Overload" will then seem to be the
problem, "excess of democracy" its cause, and
authoritarian institutions a solution waiting in
the wings.
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